China Environmental Law

Yesterday’s post endorsed a proposed climate change scenario in which China is not required to cap its carbon emission until at least 2015.  It is reasonable to ask, why as the world’s largest (and growing) CO₂ emitter can’t China do more, faster on climate change?  The BI Report does a good job of answering this question.  It notes that while China’s political system is highly centralized and disciplined, only in “certain unusual circumstances” can it ensure that its directives are being carried out across the country.  For those circumstances to exist to support a significant commitment to and real achievement of carbon limitations (or anything else for that matter), the following conditions must exist:

1. All the top leaders need to agree on the  issue.  Certainly China has acknowledged the reality of climate change, but I do not think there is unanimous agreement among the top leadership as to what needs to be done.  China is no different from the US in this regard (at least the pre-Obama US), and the BI and ASP Reports provide a plan for helping to achieve consensus at the top.

2. All the top leaders need to agree to give the issue overriding priority.  Even if consensus is reached on what needs to be done, further work must be done to move the accomplishment of the necessary tasks into the pole position.  As the BI Report notes, even within China’s environmental community there are those who feel that climate change should not be the top of the agenda and that it is an issue of concern but not immediate urgency.

3. Expend enormous domestic political capital to change the incentives that have guided the conduct of officials over recent decades.  The report notes that “[d]espite increasing efforts to build environmental and energy efficiency concerns into the incentive structure all the way down the line, most local officials still regard meeting GDP growth expectations as the primary objective.”  Especially this year where all hands have been summoned to achieve at least an 8% growth rate, adding a carbon cap challenge into the mix is not feasible.

4. Be able to determine reasonably well in real time whether their directives are being carried out.  Even if caps where agreed to starting in 2010 for instance, there is simply no way to ensure those caps are being met or effectively audit reported numbers.¹  As the BI Report gently puts it, there will be “distortions in reporting of accomplishments as information travels from local to national level.”  Thus, one of the engagement proposals is that the US help China significantly improve its “capacities to monitor and evaluate energy policy outcomes.”  This task is of vital importance and should be among the first items taken up in the new cooperative effort with China.  A certain level of measuring and monitoring capacity needs to be in place to ensure the success of even the “initial commitment period” efforts that China can be expected to undertake.

Thus, the report sets forth a plan with the “core task”

to devise ways to engage China’s leaders to lay out a conceptual framework that will promote far greater U.S.-China cooperation on climate change and clean energy along lines that realistically take into account Chinese leaders’ perceptions and concerns, and enhance their capabilities to achieve their goals.

To build trust and cooperation between the US and China and to enhance the Chinese leadership’s capabilities to achieve its goals, the reports set forth a number of steps.  The BI Report tends to be more process oriented with the ASP more project focused.  They are generally consistent in their overall goals, however.  For instance, one of the BI recommendations (#4) is “Emphasize Co-Development of Technology,” while the ASP Report addresses technology co-development in the specific context of its recommended projects.  On the other hand, one of the BI Reports process recommendations (#3) is to “Highlight One or Two Major Headline Initiatives,” two of the four  suggested “initiatives” are projects recommended in the ASP Report.  Both explicitly recommend capacity building to help China “quantify” and “project” emissions.  We will take a look at the specific project recommendations tomorrow.

A hallmark of both reports is that bilateral engagement with China on climate change (or “clean energy”) should be formally elevated to the highest level of each government and featured as soon as possible in a “leaders summit.”  Neither report seems to envision a summit devoted exclusively to climate change discussions.  The BI Report (p. 57) notes that the summit would “presumably” have “four agenda items:” “to discuss positions and actions regarding the international financial crisis and related investment/trade issues; to discuss as necessary issues such as cross-Strait relations; and to agree in principle on the promise, principles, goals and basic modalities of” the US-China clean energy/climate change engagement 

There is nothing wrong with talking about all important issues, but it is important to avoid linkage between progress in climate change and progress in other areas.  The Washington Post recently noted that “[s]ome experts . . . warn that China may demand a freer hand on such contentious issues as Taiwan and Tibet in exchange for working with the United States on reducing emissions.”  If in fact China makes such demands (and there is nothing but this report from anonymous experts to suggest they will), they should be firmly rejected.  Tackling climate change is as important to China as it is to the US; progress in the area is justified by its own merits.