China Environmental Law

I’m still working on a post addressing where China needs to be in terms of climate commitments at Copenhagen.  If you are looking for something to read today I can recommend a report published last month by the Swedish Prime Minister’s Commission on Sustainable Development entitled “A Balancing Act: China’s Role in Climate Change.“ 

The report was prepared by three individuals at the Stockholm Environment Institute.  It does a good job of describing where China has been and where it is now from a political, policy, and implementation perspective on the issue of climate change.  While the report at times veers dangerously close to the Pollyannaish, it usually brings the analysis back to reality and reaches sound conclusions.

This paragraph nicely encapsulates China’s carbon emission’s role and responsibilities. 

China accounts for near a quarter of global CO2 emissions, and an incredible 57 percent of the global increase in carbon emissions within this decade.  Furthermore, China’s per-capita emissions are already above world average [25% of current annual emissions; 20% of world's population], but still only one-quarter of the US level. Consequently, China has less room than many other developing countries to argue its right to increase per-capita emissions.  However, China does account for just less than one-tenth of global historical emissions since 1900 but could reach its global per capita share by the early 2020s if emissions continue to grow at the current pace.

Report, p. 12.

The Report has some nice figures which depict “business as usual” trends and the various reduction options and their predicted effect.

Figure 1: Schematic overview of China’s historical and possible future emission trajectories

Comment: As the Report notes, McKinsey’s figures are expressed in terms of CO2 equivalents so the green  ”McKinsey Abatement Scenario” triangle on the y axis should probably be placed at a point up to 20% lower than it is. 

Figure 6 (Compilation of CO2 Emission Projections for China) of the Report (p. 32) depicts even more scenarios.

Based on the review of these scenarios and the assumptions upon which they are based, the Report authors conclude (p. 33) that:

The different scenarios and projections indicate that China has opportunities to move towards a low-carbon development path with considerably lower growth of emissions, and that there are technical opportunities for China to reach an emission level by 2030 that begin approaching what would be needed to reach a future within 2°C bracket. Another key conclusion, however, is that this potential dwindles rapidly if mitigation actions are delayed.

So what is China willing to commit to in global climate negotiations?  Not much according to the authors.  “For multiple reasons China is highly unlikely to agree to a binding national cap on its emissions as part of a post-2012 international agreement.”  At best, China  may “commit to national policies that will lead to absolute reduction; or to intensity targets, indexed to economic growth.” (p. 91).  Under this scenario a “key” issue would be “to what extent these targets are measurable, reportable and verifiable. The U.S. would be likely to have high requirements for external verification in order to feel reassured about China’s intentions, and China would consider such external verification an infringement. (p. 98).  I think this is a fair assumption. 

In the absence of a cap, however, the authors foresee a potentially troubling development for China (and by extension, the rest of the world).

While negotiating to delay the time for capping would give China a grace period during which the country could increase emissions, the risk is that without the international support and scrutiny that would be likely to be the result of capping, China would be further locked in to its carbon intensive development structure - which in turn would add enormous costs for China in the long run.

Let’s hope that between now and when an international climate change deal is struck, China realizes the need for swift action and the advantages of a low-carbon development model, and that the level of trust between China and the developed world is increased to the point where real progress can be made.

Speaking of developing trust, as you probably know House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and a delegation of members of the House Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming (Rep. Ed Markey, D-Mass., committee chairman; Rep. James Sensenbrenner, R-Wis., ranking committee member; Rep. Earl Blumenauer, D-Ore.; Rep. Jay Inslee, D-Wash.; and Rep. Jackie Speier, D-Calif.) are visiting China this week to “engage with national and local government officials in China, as well as students, environmentalists and business leaders there on topics including climate change, clean energy and international trade.”

CELB will be engaging with some or all members of this group (and Senator John Kerry) on Monday and Tuesday.  We’ll report whatever is not off-the-record.