China Environmental Law

There was a flurry of stories this weekend that reported as breaking news the fact that US climate envoy Todd Stern was not seeking an absolute cap on carbon emissions from China.  I was a little surprised by these reports because to the best of my knowledge Stern has never stated he was seeking such a cap, and certainly nothing in the UN Framework or Bali Raodmap require a cap from China.

There are two important carbon management concepts at issue: an absolute cap and a growth rate reduction.  An absolute cap on carbon emissions sets a limit on a country’s aggregated total emissions that it agrees not to exceed.  A growth rate reduction means that a country will reduce the level of its carbon emissions per some unit (usually GDP) below a base amount (often described as “business as usual” levels) over time.  The absolute amount of carbon emissions will (assuming GDP growth) continue to increase under such a limit, but it will not increase as fast as it would have under the “business as usual” scenario.

Unfortunately some people (including me) are not always careful about the language they use to describe these two concepts, and the terminology can be confusing and lead to misinterpretations.  One could speak of limiting or reducing carbon emissions or speak of achieving carbon targets and mean either concept.

Although acknowledging some potential vagueness in the language used, I have never read any statements from Stern as suggesting that he was seeking an absolute cap on carbon emissions from China.  Perhaps the best clarification on these issues can be found at CleanBeta.

I have always assumed that getting China to commit to an absolute, binding carbon cap was probably not within the realm of the possible (much like the US agreeing to 40% reductions from 1990 levels by 2020). So the absence of such a demand from Stern, never troubled me too much. In lieu of an absolute cap, however, the carbon growth rate reductions that China commits to must be stringent enough that they force the transition to a low-carbon economy.  If that happens, then China’s emissions should peak as a result of this transition sometime between 2025 and 2035, and start to decline thereafter.

What would be news, and what would concern me, is if I thought I detected any softening in the US position that China needs to “reduce emissions very considerably compared to where they would otherwise be.”  I haven’t picked up any such wobbling yet, but we will remain vigilant.