China Environmental Law

Yesterday I wrote about my misgivings concerning the Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on Climate Change, Energy and Environment (MOU) signed at the conclusion of the US-China S&ED.  It is the flimsiest and vaguest of agreements (except for the loaded paragraph inserted at China’s insistence), yet now we learn from Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo that it was the result of “many rounds of consultations.”  That is frightening; a less than three page piece of pabulum took many rounds of consultation to draft and we have only five months left to craft an international agreement on climate change.

I’m not alone in expressing disappointment with the pace and substance of US-China climate change discussions.  Senator Kerry, while acknowledging that “real progress” was made at the S&ED, had this to say on the issue of climate change

“On climate change, perhaps the single greatest challenge we face, more could have and should have been achieved.”

“We did sign a confidential memorandum of understanding that included language on climate change. But the dates, timelines and road map toward an agreement - the fully defined mutuality of effort between our two countries - did not materialize.”

It’s an impressive turnaround [on clean energy and energy efficiency efforts], and I wish that, by itself, it were enough. But it isn’t. Aspirational statements cannot stand in for legal commitments on the international stage. That’s why I went to China this spring- to communicate that America understands that we do have an obligation to lead, and we will. But China needs to understand that we will not enter into a global treaty without a meaningful commitment from China to be part of the solution.

If we want to arrive where we all know we need to go, we have to be practical about how we get there. This will happen in stages. The debate we should be having right now is, what schedule and what scale will China act on-and will it be enough? We must persuade China that quick and decisive action is actually in its own interest. To get there, we must build a broad and deep collaboration based on what China can and will do now.

So what do the delegates actually do all day at the S&ED?  At the end of the first of the two-day session, Todd Stern, US climate envoy, participated in a teleconference where he answered questions about the day’s meetings as they related to climate change.

In summary, there was a climate change plenary session and a “special session” devoted to the topic.  Here’s what took place:

Plenary Session:

1. A “quite compelling PowerPoint presentation” from Secretary Chu “that focused both on the science and technology aspects of climate change.”

2. NDRC Vice Premier Zhang Guobao spoke on energy issues and Vice Premier Xie Zhenhua talked about the substantial steps that China is taking to limit CO2 emissions.

3. Vice Premier Wang Qishan, in his closing remarks also addressed issues relating to climate change.

Special Session:

1. John Holdren noted the scientific view that temperature increase ought to be limited to 2 degrees Celsius as compared to pre-industrial times.

2. Carol Browner described the Obama Administration’s domestic efforts on clean energy and climate change.

3. Todd Stern talked about the state of U.S.-China cooperation and efforts on the international front.

4. Mr. Xie and Mr. Zhang spoke again for China, as did [this is my favorite] Madame Ye who “spoke on forest efforts in China.”

In sum, we had a lot of presentations on what seems like pretty basic stuff.  Couldn’t all of this material have been put into some sort of briefing book that people could have read in advance?  Is it really necessary to spend the rapidly dwindling opportunity for face-to-face time before Copenhagen talking about the science of climate change or China’s 20% energy efficiency improvement goals?

While I have looked with scorn on the climate change fruits of this S&ED, let me note that I continue to respect the work of Todd Stern.  It is by no means clear that he was in a position to stop the MOU with the objectionable language from being signed (the signature version has a rough quality to it that suggests it was put together at the last minute, and may not have been the subject of a full and considered review).

In answer to the question I posed yesterday: Why do you need to establish a “Dialogue” to have a dialogue?  Stern has provided us the answer, “you don’t.”

I think Mr. Xie [China's chief climate change negotiator] said that - today in the meeting that he counted that he and I had met seven times. I haven’t actually counted that, but that sounds perfectly plausible to me.

What you need to have successful negotiations is a party willing to negotiate.  In the absence of that, the dialogues are consumed by presentations on “forest efforts.”

But in the face of all this, Stern remains a trooper:

With respect to prospects [of a climate change agreement], you know, we’re slogging ahead. I think that we will get there. I think we will end up with an agreement. But the perspectives of the major developing countries like China, India, and the others is quite different. The issues are difficult. There is a lot of engrained and embedded perspective on this issue that goes back now for 15 years. And, you know, I think I’m not going to kid anybody; I don’t think it’s easy, but I do think that we will get there, and I think that there is a lot of interest on the Chinese side fundamentally to arrive at a constructive and successful outcome in Copenhagen. And I do think we will get there, but I think it’s going to come one step at a time, one meeting at a time, one conversation at a time, and not in some sudden fell swoop or sudden breakthrough.

Stern’s concluding remarks run counter to the prognosis of how US-China climate change talks will unfold according to a source of Joe Romm, at Climate Progress.

Now I’m told by a non-government source who spends a lot of time talking to the Chinese about climate and clean energy that China is prepared to make such an announcement [on sharply changing its business as usual emissions path], but probably not until Obama visits the country after the APEC meeting in mid-November.  If this is true, then administration and Senate leaders should delayed a final Senate vote until after that.

Joe’s source may be confused.  Many people are speculating that the US and China will execute some sort of large bilateral clean energy cooperation/innovation agreement when President Obama visits China in November.  With any luck the agreement will contain some or all of the eight initiatives (see under File Attachment(s) “CEF Initiatives-PRINT FINAL.pdf”) that have been proposed, after months of dedicated effort by working groups of US and Chinese participants under the auspices of the US-China Clean Energy Forum (CEF).

No one should underestimate the efforts undertaken and service rendered by CEF in advancing US China cooperative efforts on clean energy.  It has been clear for some time that US China engagement on climate change must take a two track approach with one track devoted to cooperative, trust-building efforts in shared solution development and innovation in creating a low carbon economy.  The good people at CEF (US and Chinese) have down the yeoman’s work on this front, and they deserve our thanks.

The CEF initiatives, however, do not address (on purpose) the thornier, second track issue of carbon limits.  I would be very surprised to see a big announcement from China on this issue during Obama’s visit.  If China is prepared to make new concessions to help break the Copenhagen log jam it will do so in a forum more international in focus and without any suggestion that it was making the concession in response to US pressure.  In addition, I can assure you that if China does decide to make a new proposal, its first move out of the box will not be sufficient to satisfy the US climate negotiators, much less skeptical US Senators.  A November Obama visit surprise from China on carbon limits?  I wouldn’t count on it.  I suspect we will just keep slogging on.