I will have a longer post on the Copenhagen Accord when the dust settles. It is pretty clear from the Chinese press reports that China doesn’t know what to make of the Accord or how to spin it yet. One thing is abundantly clear, however, unlike US commentators who have praised the Accord for moving beyond the binary developed/developing nation distinctions, China resolutely contends that these distinctions remain and the principle of “common, but differentiated” continues in full force and effect.
The accord upheld the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” set by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, made arrangements for developed countries’ compulsory emissions cuts and developing countries’ voluntary mitigation actions, and included wide consensus on the key issues of long-term global emissions reduction objectives, funding and technology support, and transparency.
The language of the Accord certainly supports the Chinese reading, although some, albeit minor, lessening of the “differentiation” between the responsibilities of developed and the larger emitters among the “developing” countries is also in evidence.
One other thing is certain, China and the US still have a significant way to go to develop a level of trust that will allow them to discuss and negotiate these issues rationally. The events of last Friday bear more resemblance to a Keystone Kop feature than a functioning, working relationship between two superpowers on one of the most important issues of our age.
8 responses so far ↓
1 ange // Dec 21, 2009 at 1:48 pm
Hi Charlie,
Well, this is my initial thoughts. I need to do a lot more reading though.
The principle of CBDR has been retained in the accord struck at Copenhagen. This is a good thing because it is just and underscores the importance of climate change’s moral implications.
Regrettably, in the past CBDR has proven to be the major sticking point between countries. It has been used by both sides as a justification for inaction. The US could never agree to CBDR and used it to argue that any mitigation efforts by the US would not only damage the economy but have little or no effect on the atmosphere while China remained without commitment.
China quite rightly protested at reducing its emissions citing the developed world’s emissons history and surplus over its right to development.
Essentially at a global level it boiled down to ‘you go first’. For 17 years this acted as a bolster to inaction with the US failing to even ratify the protocol, leading to an impasse on global action.
My sympathies in this situation are with the developing countries. It should not be forgotten that there are many developing countries who remain incapable of making emissions cuts and the tragedy is magnified by the fact that they are by and large the most vulnerable to climate change.
However, there is truth to the assertion that rapidly industrialising countries are able to harness the activity in their economies to change over to renewables and develop and produce green technology.
Recent commitments by China and India to shift into gear and volunteer to reduce emissions should act as a philip to the US. Not only are they demonstrating leadership by going first, and seizing the moral high ground, but in doing so disprove the theory peddled by the US that under CBDR, China would continue to pollute to its heart’s content.
The deadlock broken, the ball is now squarely in the court of the US. And even if it has been excruciatingly slow, finally the US has agreed to participate in the dialogue of the accord. It may not seem like much, but the promise of aid, though but a trickle at first, sets up a channel. The in principle agreement to limit warming to 2 degrees is a lot more important than it sounds, for it is the first time a value has been put on the atmosphere, and can be converted to ppm. This helps combat the ‘tragedy of the commons’/sovereignty problem.
Progress is slow, but it is progress all the same. No point in throwing the baby out with the bathwater. I hope it can turn into a meaningful dialogue and something more cooperative. While not overjoyed, I can see some merit if for no other reason than that it is the first time the ball has moved in 17 years.
2 Fons Tuinstra // Dec 21, 2009 at 6:13 pm
It might be interested to wait till some of the Belgium press reports have been discovered by the news agencies. According to Belgium diplomats the Copenhagen agreements has been killed at the last moment on Friday evening when everybody was already preparing champagne bottles. There was no way China would accept control of its own emissions or an agreement to curtail its economic growth. Say the reports, based on anonymous (but obvious Belgium) diplomats.
3 Greg // Dec 22, 2009 at 10:41 am
@ ange,
The developing world is using its current status to willfully engage in destructive practices. There is no excuse for this bad behavior.
4 Stuart // Dec 22, 2009 at 1:42 pm
Ok I’m confused:
1. we have China making 2 major pre-Copenhagen promises on voluntary emissions cuts
2, The US goes to Copenhagen with NO PROMISES to cut anything - Ok, some thoughts on what cuts might be when/if congress approves, but nothing on the table
3. EPA declares carbon emissions ‘a health risk’ - widely lauded in the Western media as permitting Obama to act unilaterally at some time in the future.
4. Clinton announcing a US$100 billion fund for the developing world - again to much media razmataz and pats on the collective US back for ‘bold action’
However, as details emerge it turns out that it isn’t really a $100bn US fund, its everybody’s fund- the US promises to contribute $3bn, EU to contribute $9bn (I recall) and Japan has already poneyed-up $11 billion.
Were I a cynic, I’d think the developed world took pity on the poor woman because she really had nothing else to say, and allowed her to make the announcement!(like the orphan at the party is allowed to present the gifts)
Of course, it is all meaningless money talk, as the developing world knows since the BBC uncovered that much of the billions promised under Kyoto had never been honoured or contributed, most of what had been contributed hadn’t been disbursed see: http://tinyurl.com/y9wqmgx.
THEN… the main man comes ot town… insults the Chinese and demands that they submit to ‘verification’ (of their voluntary targets).
So, here’s the source of my utter confusion:
1. If the US hasn’t committed to cutting anything how can it demand that those who have committed to something be subject to verification? Possibly a clever bluff, uping the ante when you have no cards in your hand. (implications being “let’s face it, we all know the Chinese can’t be trusted”)
2. Who exactly is going to do the verification? Some independent body? Something like the IAEA, for example… and we all know how effective they were when the US insisted that Sadam had a smoking gun!
It looks very much like Roger Daltry & the WHO got it right: ‘meet the new boss, same as the old boss’
And Papua New Guinea was right when it said to the US at Bali “We looked for leadership - if you’re not prepared ot lead, get out of hte way!”
Or… being somewhat confused, have I got this all wrong?
5 observer // Dec 23, 2009 at 11:57 am
Stuart
You have it completely wrong, Copenhagen was a disaster. That much is agreed. But the truth about what actually happened is in danger of being lost amid the spin and inevitable mutual recriminations. The truth is this: China wrecked the talks, intentionally humiliated Barack Obama, and insisted on an awful “deal” so western leaders would walk away carrying the blame. How do I know this? Because I was in the room and saw it happen.
China’s strategy was simple: block the open negotiations for two weeks, and then ensure that the closed-door deal made it look as if the west had failed the world’s poor once again. And sure enough, the aid agencies, civil society movements and environmental groups all took the bait. The failure was “the inevitable result of rich countries refusing adequately and fairly to shoulder their overwhelming responsibility”, said Christian Aid. “Rich countries have bullied developing nations,” fumed Friends of the Earth International.
All very predictable, but the complete opposite of the truth. Even George Monbiot, writing in yesterday’s Guardian, made the mistake of singly blaming Obama. But I saw Obama fighting desperately to salvage a deal, and the Chinese delegate saying “no”, over and over again. Monbiot even approvingly quoted the Sudanese delegate Lumumba Di-Aping, who denounced the Copenhagen accord as “a suicide pact, an incineration pact, in order to maintain the economic dominance of a few countries”.
Sudan behaves at the talks as a puppet of China; one of a number of countries that relieves the Chinese delegation of having to fight its battles in open sessions. It was a perfect stitch-up. China gutted the deal behind the scenes, and then left its proxies to savage it in public.
Here’s what actually went on late last Friday night, as heads of state from two dozen countries met behind closed doors. Obama was at the table for several hours, sitting between Gordon Brown and the Ethiopian prime minister, Meles Zenawi. The Danish prime minister chaired, and on his right sat Ban Ki-moon, secretary-general of the UN. Probably only about 50 or 60 people, including the heads of state, were in the room. I was attached to one of the delegations, whose head of state was also present for most of the time.
The Chinese premier, Wen Jinbao, did not deign to attend the meetings personally, instead sending a second-tier official in the country’s foreign ministry to sit opposite Obama himself. The diplomatic snub was obvious and brutal, as was the practical implication: several times during the session, the world’s most powerful heads of state were forced to wait around as the Chinese delegate went off to make telephone calls to his “superiors”.
Shifting the blame
To those who would blame Obama and rich countries in general, know this: it was China’s representative who insisted that industrialised country targets, previously agreed as an 80% cut by 2050, be taken out of the deal. “Why can’t we even mention our own targets?” demanded a furious Angela Merkel. Australia’s prime minister, Kevin Rudd, was annoyed enough to bang his microphone. Brazil’s representative too pointed out the illogicality of China’s position. Why should rich countries not announce even this unilateral cut? The Chinese delegate said no, and I watched, aghast, as Merkel threw up her hands in despair and conceded the point. Now we know why ? because China bet, correctly, that Obama would get the blame for the Copenhagen accord’s lack of ambition.
China, backed at times by India, then proceeded to take out all the numbers that mattered. A 2020 peaking year in global emissions, essential to restrain temperatures to 2C, was removed and replaced by woolly language suggesting that emissions should peak “as soon as possible”. The long-term target, of global 50% cuts by 2050, was also excised. No one else, perhaps with the exceptions of India and Saudi Arabia, wanted this to happen. I am certain that had the Chinese not been in the room, we would have left Copenhagen with a deal that had environmentalists popping champagne corks popping in every corner of the world.
Strong position
So how did China manage to pull off this coup? First, it was in an extremely strong negotiating position. China didn’t need a deal. As one developing country foreign minister said to me: “The Athenians had nothing to offer to the Spartans.” On the other hand, western leaders in particular ? but also presidents Lula of Brazil, Zuma of South Africa, Calderón of Mexico and many others ? were desperate for a positive outcome. Obama needed a strong deal perhaps more than anyone. The US had confirmed the offer of $100bn to developing countries for adaptation, put serious cuts on the table for the first time (17% below 2005 levels by 2020), and was obviously prepared to up its offer.
Above all, Obama needed to be able to demonstrate to the Senate that he could deliver China in any global climate regulation framework, so conservative senators could not argue that US carbon cuts would further advantage Chinese industry. With midterm elections looming, Obama and his staff also knew that Copenhagen would be probably their only opportunity to go to climate change talks with a strong mandate. This further strengthened China’s negotiating hand, as did the complete lack of civil society political pressure on either China or India. Campaign groups never blame developing countries for failure; this is an iron rule that is never broken. The Indians, in particular, have become past masters at co-opting the language of equity (”equal rights to the atmosphere”) in the service of planetary suicide ? and leftish campaigners and commentators are hoist with their own petard.
With the deal gutted, the heads of state session concluded with a final battle as the Chinese delegate insisted on removing the 1.5C target so beloved of the small island states and low-lying nations who have most to lose from rising seas. President Nasheed of the Maldives, supported by Brown, fought valiantly to save this crucial number. “How can you ask my country to go extinct?” demanded Nasheed. The Chinese delegate feigned great offence ? and the number stayed, but surrounded by language which makes it all but meaningless. The deed was done.
China’s game
All this raises the question: what is China’s game? Why did China, in the words of a UK-based analyst who also spent hours in heads of state meetings, “not only reject targets for itself, but also refuse to allow any other country to take on binding targets?” The analyst, who has attended climate conferences for more than 15 years, concludes that China wants to weaken the climate regulation regime now “in order to avoid the risk that it might be called on to be more ambitious in a few years’ time”.
This does not mean China is not serious about global warming. It is strong in both the wind and solar industries. But China’s growth, and growing global political and economic dominance, is based largely on cheap coal. China knows it is becoming an uncontested superpower; indeed its newfound muscular confidence was on striking display in Copenhagen. Its coal-based economy doubles every decade, and its power increases commensurately. Its leadership will not alter this magic formula unless they absolutely have to.
Copenhagen was much worse than just another bad deal, because it illustrated a profound shift in global geopolitics. This is fast becoming China’s century, yet its leadership has displayed that multilateral environmental governance is not only not a priority, but is viewed as a hindrance to the new superpower’s freedom of action. I left Copenhagen more despondent than I have felt in a long time. After all the hope and all the hype, the mobilisation of thousands, a wave of optimism crashed against the rock of global power politics, fell back, and drained away.
6 Caitlin // Dec 23, 2009 at 12:16 pm
What do you make of this account from someone who was in the room. The way he tells it, China and China alone wrecked the summit and any chance of a meaningful deal. http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/22/copenhagen-climate-change-mark-lynas
7 Caitlin // Dec 23, 2009 at 12:17 pm
I agree with @Greg. Though it’s not the whole of the developing world, it’s certain players within it.
8 Daniel Michaeli // Dec 25, 2009 at 12:15 am
Re: Fons Tuinstra, Greg, Caitlin. I think China’s climate change policy and approach to Copenhagen was based on balancing three concerns: economic growth, pollution-related unrest, and international economic pressure. But China essentially miscalculated, and now faces an even higher chance of facing emissions-related import tariffs on its products in the United States and the EU.
Re: observer, I think the point that China is trying to weaken the climate change regime now, so it is not called upon to take bigger steps in the future, is worth considering more….
I recently wrote two relevant posts on my blog that may interest you. The first, Copenhagen: “China Won”? basically asks whether China has shot itself in the foot and may face trade consequences. The second, Is China Afraid of International Scrutiny?” is in response to a Foreign Policy.com article. I look at an argument being made for why China was unwilling to accept transparency, and propose the three reasons I mentioned above.
Great blog, Charlie, and I look forward to reading your take on all this!
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